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Reinvigorating the Tradition of 
Symbolic Interactionism 
Philip Manning 
Cleveland State University 
I take Scheff's article to be in the honorable tradition of scholarly work that tries to 
preserve the best of the past while anticipating and contributing to the expansion of 
ideas, Scheff recognizes the pivotal importance of Goffman's work to symbolic in­
teractionism in particular and to sociology in general and wants to expand our un­
derstanding of Goffman by revealing a poorly recognized debt. This debt connects 
Goffman to his predecessor Cooley, who had outlined a simple, powerful model of 
social interaction aptly named the "looking-glass self." In Scheff's view, recognizing 
this debt deepens our understanding of Goffman's dramaturgical approach, partic­
ularly the version of dramaturgy that is found in The Presentation of Self in Every-
day Life (1959). This, in tnm, is important because it opens the door to a sociology 
of emotions. As Scheff points out, Goffman pursued the sociology of emotions in a 
narrow way, focusing on embarrassment. Scheff advocates a wider view, which he 
associates with Hochschild's (2003) work. This exists at the intersection of symbolic 
interactionism and psychoanalysis. As an example of what can be harvested from 
this approach, Scheff presents an intriguing account of the role of shame in social 
life. Someone who has shame has, in Goffman's (1963) vocabulary, a "discredited 
self" because his or her stigma is publicly known. As Scheff and Goffman suggest, 
embarrassment is the recognition that shaming is occurring. Embarrassment marks 
the transition from a discreditable to a discredited self. By contrast, someone who 
feels guilt has only a "discreditable self" because no one else knows yet of the 
stigma. Thus shame is temporally connected to guilt. This was part of the fascination 
with guilt for Philip Rieff (1990), whose sociological investigation of guilt as a guid­
ing and constraining emotion also led him back to Cooley. 
Here I want to present four issnes that I think are implicitly or explicitly raised 
by Scheff's interesting article. Their explication must itself be part of the reinvigo­
rating of the tradition that Scheff has initiated. First, I wish to consider the role of 
the looking-glass self in Cooley's overall approach. Second, I will comment on 
weaknesses in Goffman's analysis of the self. Third, I will comment on the prospects 
for a synthesis of symbolic interactionist and psychoanalytic concerns. Fourth, I 
want to question Scheff's view that Goffman was a theorist of what he calls our "in­
terior life" and sketch an alternative account of Goffman's project and achievement. 
THE LOOKING-GLASS SELF 
It is important to distinguish two different claims that Scheff could be making. 111e 
first is the broad claim that we can now understand Goffman's work better (al­
though "better" will itself require careful explication) by recognizing his debt to 
Cooley. This broad claim makes Cooley Goffman's intellectual mentor, just as we 
might say, for example, that we can understand the work of an ethnomethodologist 
such as Melvin Pollner in a better way by recognizing his debt to Harold Garfinkel. 
By contrast, the narrow claim we could take from Scheff's article is that a particular 
concept in Cooley's work the looking-glass self helps us to understand a particu­
lar group of concepts in Goffman's work, all concerning dramaturgy. It would 
clearly be more revealing to establish the broad claim, but of course it will also be 
harder. The narrow claim should be easier to establish, but the potential payoff 
seems much smaller. I will look at each briefly. 
Elsewhere (Manning 2005) I have argued that there are three themes that domi­
nate Cooley's work: (\) a sociology of culture that serves as a political assessment of 
Progressivism, (2) a proto-symbolic interactionism, and (3) an account of "sympa­
thetic introspection" as the "principal method of the social psychologist" (Cooley 
1916:7).1 do not want to dwell on the details of Cooley's sociology of culture, but it 
is worth recognizing that it contained both a political assessment and an evolution­
ary perspective that were central to the debates of his day. In defending a liberal, 
pluralist position, Cooley found himself at odds with both the pro-business doc­
trines found in the earlier work of, among his peers, William Sumner and the more 
left-leaning work of Ross, Small, Veblen, and others. As Rieff (1990:300) has made 
clear, Cooley's sociology of culture relied on a relativistic faith in the healing power 
of primary groups. It is of course the second strand in Cooley's work, which I am 
calling "proto symbolic interactionism" that is central to Scheff's analysis. How­
ever, Cooley's thinking is still at several removes from the symbolic interactionist 
premises that we associate with Blumer. This is primarily because Cooley struggled 
to incorporate a theory of instinct into sociology. Cooley (1902 [1964]:4) referred to 
heredity as a "stream" and culture as a "road" running "along the bank" of the 
stream. Although he accepted the importance of both modes of transmission, he 
struggled to see how instincts could be assigned to either of them. His solution was 
to make instincts the result of an amalgam of heredity and culture. He therefore 
created a new term, "instinctive emotions," to convey this and named five types: 
anger, fear, maternal love, the sex drive, and a self-assertive drive for power (p. 25). 
In the second but not in the first edition of Human Nature and Social Order, Cooley 
explicitly tied this debate to a discussion of the merits of psychoanalysis, thereby 
confinning Scheff's general observation (famously it was Parsons's also) that symbolic 
interactionists and psychoanalysts have overlapping interests. Cooley then sought 
to connect his new analysis of instinctive emotions with a thoroughly sociological­
and implicitly Durkheimian-account of both the interconnection of the individual 
and society and our general interdependence. 
Cooley's account of the looking-glass self is not really given pride of place in his 
work, and a reader of the first edition of Human Nature and Social Order in 1902 
might easily miss the concept, as it is buried in the middle of a chapter in the middle 
of the book. However, Scheff is right that the looking-glass opens the door to the 
sociological investigation of our interior world, albeit very quietly. Cooley brought 
sociology to a crossroads when it had either to embrace some kind of psychoanaly­
sis or to move away from it. This is because the three "principal elements" of the 
looking-glass self all involve the internal world of the individual: the first concerns 
the "imagination" of our appearance, the second the "imagination" of a judgment 
being made about us, and the third our sense of "self-feeling" (1902 [1964]:184). In 
each case, Cooley urges sociologists to engage in the study of internal worlds that, 
nearly a hundred years on, we are likely to see as some kind of object-relations, psy­
choanalytic project. The amazing possibilities here have been explored in an ex­
traordinarily rich paper by Wiley (2003), in which he investigates the overlapping 
use of the mirror metaphor by Cooley and Lacan. Elliott (2001) has also recognized 
the same theoretical convergence. 
Cooley'S quiet, radical gesture led him to the methodology of "sympathetic in­
trospection" in which he anticipated our contemporary debates about ethnography 
and autoe thnography. Cooley was too reticent to engage in empirical work himself 
(unless you count the carpentry of which he was rightly proud). However, he urged 
his colleagues to go into the field and have "intimate contact with various sorts of 
persons ... allowing them to awake in [them] a life similar to their own" (1916:7). 
These observations lead me to the conclusion that the broad claim that Cooley'S 
cultural sociology helps us to understand Goffman's sociology is true only in a very 
general way. The narrow claim is more promising-that Cooley's concept of the 
looking-glass self helps us to understand Goffman's dramaturgical ideas. To antici­
pate the argument I will propose later, I think Scheff has found a very interesting 
way of identifying a weakness in Goffman that was not in Cooley. In arguing in this 
way, I am adapting Scheff's ideas. I take Goffman's unwillingness to follow the rad­
ical implications of Cooley's unexpectedly proto-psychoanalytic formulations to be 
the cause of some of his difficulties. It leads us to the complaint aired in many forms 
that Goffman is primarily an analyst of the presentation of self and not of the self. 
He therefore chose not to follow the logic of Cooley's position but instead sought to 
remain in the domain of the observable. 
GOFFMAN'S ANALYSIS OF THE SELF 
As I have just suggested, Goffman provided us with a model of the structure of 
social interaction, not a model of the performing agent. Wrong (1998:22-23) has 
suggested that Goffman and (other) symbolic interactionists fail to provide a con­
vincing account of what motivates us to do whatever we do. In Rieff's mischievous 
phrase, Goffman has no interest in "interior decorating." 
Other commentators have also noted that, like Durkheim, Goffman did not con­
sider a person's inner world to be the appropriate subject matter of sociology. 
Lyman and Scott (1975:107) argue that Goffman's dramaturgical approach takes us 
out of people's heads and into public places. Williams (1998:154) makes a similar 
observation when he notes that Goffman treated a person's inner life as irrelevant 
and focused instead on "externally observable forms of conduct." Philosophers con­
cur: Glover (1988:175) argues that Goffman mistakenly treats us as people with no 
"inner story," and MacIntyre (1982:30, 108-10) bemoans Goffman's amoral vision 
of social life in which the self is "liquidated" into its role-playing. Sennett (1970:36) 
puts the matter very concisely when he notes that in Goffman's world there are 
scenes but no plots. 
And Goffman seemed quite happy to accept this judgment. In the unexpectedly 
useful Verhoeven interview (1993:322-24), Goffman said plainly that the individual 
is not "the central unit" and that he sees himself as an "ethnographer of small enti­
ties." He later added (in a passage reminiscent of Mead) that although reality is so­
cially constructed, he does not think that "the individual himself or herself does 
much of the constructing." The thought is succinctly stated in the preface to Interac-
tion Ritual where Goffman asserts, "Not, then, men and their moments. Rather mo­
ments and their men" (1967:3). 
Recently, Archer (2000:317) made a similar point and found a new debt left un­
paid by Goffman. This time it is not owed just to Cooley but to us all. Archer com­
plains that Goffman's account of the presentation of self was limited to "presenta­
tional acts" and to their "public outworkings." "Goffman," Archer claimed, "owed 
us an account of the self, but left the bill unpaid" (p. 317). 
SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 
Although Scheff characterizes both Cooley and Goffman as "analysts of interior 
life," I think it is more apt to say that Cooley favored an introspective dimension of 
sociological work but Goffman chose to downplay it. Therefore, I believe Cooley's 
theorizing is important to our understanding of Goffman because he grasped the 
importance of the study of interior lives, whereas Goffman, like Durkheim, be­
lieved that this was uot the coucern of the sociologist. 
Scheff is right when he points out that Goffman, like Blumer, opposed psycho­
analysis as both a theory aud a practice. Goffmau's exteusive knowledge of psycho­
analysis had made him a kind of symbolic interactionist imperialist, leaving him to 
believe that psychoanalytic e:,:planations are simply inferior to our own homespun 
ones. In this regard we are better placed than Goffman, and Scheff acknowledges 
that the work of Hochschild (2003) on the sociology of emotions is an important de­
velopment for the field. I think that it is also worth recognizing that Chodorow 
(1999) and Prager (1998) have assisted in the reconstruction of a version of psycho­
analysis that is compatible with-and valuable to-symbolic interactionism. Hochs­
child, Chodorow, and Prager allow us to see the missing link between Cooley and 
Goffman that many commentators allude to when they criticize Goffman's theory 
of the self. 
Chodorow and Prager have double lives as both sociologists and psychoanalysts. 
They provide symbolic interactionists with a reconstructed, stripped-down psycho­
analysis that has no clinical aspirations, deterministic metaphors, or developmental 
schemata. Instead, the concepts of transference and countertransference are brought 
center stage. As Chodorow (1999:26) puts it, "In my view, the discovery of transfer­
ence constitutes, perhaps, the root psychoanalytic discovery." Transference is "the 
hypothesis and demonstration that our inner world of psychic reality helps to create, 
shape, and give meaning to the inter-subjective, social, and cultural worlds we in­
habit. lt is the original psychoanalytic vehicle for documenting for us the power of 
feelings" (Chodorow 1999:14). This formulation is eerily similar to Cooley's notion 
of the looking-glass self. 
Cooley recognized the importance of sympathetic introspection, but his talents 
did not extend to empirical research, and so there is no demonstration from him of 
how to practice sociology. Contemporary versions of psychoanalysis that prioritize 
the investigation of transference are valuable tools enabling symbolic interaction­
ists to realize the project that Cooley had only sketched out. 
Earlier I suggested that Cooley anticipated our current debates about ethnogra­
phy and autoethnography. The matter can now be put more forcefully: insofar as 
the autoethnographer participates in the activities, experiences, and emotions that 
are common to group membership, then the resulting analysis is a fonn of sympa­
thetic introspection that is an investigation of the sociologist's own countertransfer­
ence (Manning 2005). 
GOFFMAN'S PROJECTS 
Scheff argues that The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) is Goffman's 
"basic work." It is not easy to know exactly what is meant by this. It is true that the 
book was both his first major publication and a version of ideas developed in his 
doctoral dissertation (1953 ).It is also true, as Scheff suggests, that the book has had 
an enormous impact and has generated a sense of awe in many of its readers. How­
ever, I do not think that The Presentation ofSelf is Goffman's most important work. 
The arguments developed there are extended in Frame Analysis (1974), a book that 
Goffman probably intended to be his magnum opus. 
However, in light of the comments in the previous section, I prefer to see (it is no 
more than this) Asylums (1961) as the litmus test for Goffman's sociology. This is 
becanse Goffman was able to do in this book what Cooley conld not, namely, pro­
vide a case study of his ideas. In a brilliant methodological display, Goffman ex­
tended our understanding of ethnographic research, transforming the research agenda 
of symbolic interactionism away from the ethnography of places and onto the eth­
nography of concepts. Asylums is so well known to us that we can easily overlook 
the radical, revolutionary transformation of an ethnography of Saint Elizabeth's 
hospital in Washington, D.c., in the 1950s into an ethnography of the concept of the 
total institution (Manning 1992, 1999a, 1999b). 
We have had more than forty years to absorb the implications of Goffman's rad­
ical, empirical transformation, and yet I believe we have only begun to understand 
the significance of Goffman's breakthrough. Nevertheless, the weaknesses that 
have been identified in Goffman's work in general resonate in Asylums also. The 
book contains little of Cooley's sympathetic introspection or the countertransfer­
ence of Chodorow or Prager. The theoretical and empirical project that I take to be 
central to symbolic interactionism now concerns the fusion of Goffman's ethnogra­
phies of concepts with the analysis of transference and countertransference. Cooley 
will reemerge as an important element in the reconstruction. The result will be a 
blurring of the two genres ethnography and authoethnography. This blurring of 
genres was anticipated by Junker (1960) in his often overlooked textbook of quali­
tative methods and endorsed by Hughes. 
For these reasons, Scheff is right to bring Cooley back to our attention and to 
make us reread Goffman in the light of Cooley. I have drawn a different set of con­
clusions from this rereading, but lowe Scheff a debt of gratitude for reinvigorating 
the tradition of symbolic interactionism. This, then, is the third of at least three 
debts still outstanding. 
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